Originally Published By Vanguard
The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War (1967–1970), ended with a formal instrument of surrender, which the Biafrans signed under specific conditions and understandings. One of the most crucial components of the surrender agreement was the promise of equality, fair treatment, and the maintenance of Nigeria’s political and administrative structures as they existed at the time, with the understanding that any future changes would be decided by consensus. However, over the years, the Nigerian government has repeatedly violated the terms of this agreement, making unilateral changes to Nigeria’s administrative and political systems without consulting the South-East region (Igbo-Biafra) or securing the consensus of both parties as required. These violations have fundamentally undermined the legitimacy of Nigeria’s administration over the South-East and provide a significant justification for the region’s demand for remedial secession.
The Instrument of Surrender and the Conditions for Reunification
The civil war was a devastating chapter in Nigeria’s history, with over a million deaths, most of them Biafrans who died from starvation, disease, and violence. After nearly three years of intense conflict, Biafra surrendered to Nigeria on January 15, 1970, with the hope that reintegration would bring peace, stability, and fair treatment for all Nigerians, including the Igbo people who had suffered tremendously during the war.
One of the key figures during the surrender negotiations was Sir Louis Mbanefo, the former Chief Justice of Biafra. He played a pivotal role in ensuring that the terms of surrender were not merely symbolic but carried specific provisions that would protect the political and administrative integrity of the South-East region within a united Nigeria. Among the critical components of the surrender agreement was the incorporation of a clause, often referred to as Clause ‘C,’ which outlined that any future modifications to Nigeria’s administrative or political structure would require the consensus of both parties, particularly the Biafrans, as a safeguard against marginalisation or unilateral decisions that could harm the interests of the South-East.
At the time of the surrender, Nigeria was divided into 12 states, a structure that was considered equitable in terms of representation and resource allocation across the country. The understanding was that this political arrangement would remain intact unless there was broad national consensus to make changes. This assurance was a critical factor in the Biafrans’ decision to end hostilities and rejoin Nigeria, as it provided a safeguard against potential political manipulation or exclusion in the future.
Unilateral State Creation: The Violation of the Agreement
Despite the clear terms of the surrender agreement, the Nigerian government, beginning with the military regimes of General Murtala Mohammed and General Olusegun Obasanjo, unilaterally altered Nigeria’s political structure by increasing the number of states without consulting the South-East region or securing the required consensus. In 1976, only six years after the end of the civil war, General Mohammed expanded Nigeria’s state structure from 12 to 19 states, a move that was made without the input or agreement of the South-East region. This marked the beginning of a series of state creations that continued under successive military regimes.
The process of state creation continued under General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha, who further increased the number of states to 30 and 36, respectively. By the time Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, the country had a federal structure consisting of 36 states, a sharp departure from the 12-state structure that had been agreed upon during the 1970 surrender. Crucially, this expansion in the number of states did not benefit the South-East region. While other geopolitical zones were granted additional states, the South-East was left with only five states, compared to six or more states in other regions. This created a significant imbalance in political representation and federal resource allocation, placing the South-East at a distinct disadvantage.
The unilateral creation of states by the Nigerian government without consulting the South-East region directly violated the terms of the surrender agreement, which had stipulated that both parties must agree on any changes to Nigeria’s political structure. This breach not only disregarded the assurances given to the Biafrans at the end of the war but also deepened the region’s sense of marginalisation and exclusion within the Nigerian federation.
Impact of State Creation on Political Representation and Resource Allocation
The creation of additional states in regions outside the South-East had profound implications for political representation and the distribution of federal resources. In Nigeria’s federal system, political representation in the National Assembly—particularly in the Senate—is based on the number of states in each region. Each state is entitled to three senators, regardless of population size, which means that regions with more states have significantly more representation in the Senate. For example, the North-West region, with seven states, has 21 senators, while the South-East, with only five states, has 15 senators. This imbalance in representation has diluted the political influence of the South-East in the national legislative process.
In addition to political representation, the creation of additional states in other regions has also skewed the distribution of federal resources in favour of those regions. Nigeria’s revenue-sharing formula allocates a significant portion of federal funds based on the number of states and local government areas (LGAs) in each region. Because the South-East has fewer states and LGAs, it receives a disproportionately smaller share of federal resources compared to other regions, despite its significant contributions to Nigeria’s economy, particularly through oil production and commerce.
The creation of additional states without a corresponding increase in the number of states in the South-East has perpetuated a cycle of political and economic marginalisation for the region. This structural imbalance, which was created in violation of the terms of the 1970 surrender agreement, has left the South-East with limited political power and insufficient resources to address the region’s developmental needs. The failure to honour the agreement has undermined the legitimacy of the Nigerian state’s governance over the South-East and has contributed to the growing calls for secession.
The Legal and Moral Implications of the Violation
The violation of the 1970 surrender agreement carries significant legal and moral implications for Nigeria’s relationship with the South-East region. At the heart of the Biafrans’ decision to end the war was the belief that they would be treated as equal citizens within a unified Nigeria and that any future changes to the country’s political structure would be made with their input and agreement. The unilateral creation of states without the consent of the South-East represents a betrayal of that promise and has fundamentally undermined the legitimacy of Nigeria’s administration over the region.
International law recognises that the legitimacy of a state’s territorial integrity is contingent upon its ability to uphold agreements and provide equal treatment to all of its citizens. When a state violates agreements that form the basis of its governance, particularly agreements that were made in the context of conflict resolution, it weakens its claim to legitimacy. In the case of the South-East region, the Nigerian government’s violation of the terms of the 1970 surrender agreement has contributed to the erosion of trust between the region and the federal government, reinforcing the argument for remedial secession.
The moral implications of this violation are equally significant. The Biafrans, having endured the horrors of the civil war, agreed to surrender on the understanding that they would be reintegrated into Nigeria as equal citizens. The government’s failure to honour that commitment not only disregards the suffering of the Igbo people during the war but also perpetuates the same patterns of marginalisation and exclusion that led to the conflict in the first place. By unilaterally altering the political structure of the country to the detriment of the South-East, the Nigerian government has shown a lack of respect for the principles of equality, fairness, and justice.
Remedial Secession as a Response to the Violation
Under international law, the principle of remedial secession provides a framework for understanding when a region or group may seek secession as a last resort in response to grave injustices. The violation of the 1970 surrender agreement, combined with the ongoing political and economic marginalisation of the South-East region, provides a compelling justification for remedial secession. The Nigerian government’s unilateral creation of states without the consent of the South-East has deprived the region of political power and federal resources, exacerbating the inequalities that have plagued the region since the end of the civil war.
Remedial secession is recognised as a legitimate response in cases where a state has failed to uphold agreements or protect the rights of a particular group. In the case of the South-East, the government’s violation of the surrender agreement represents a failure to provide the region with the political representation and economic resources it was promised. The region’s repeated attempts to address these grievances through internal political processes have been met with resistance or ignored, leaving secession as the only viable option for achieving justice and equality.
Conclusion: Violation of the Agreement and Justification for Secession
The modification of Nigeria’s political and administrative systems without the consensus outlined in the 1970 instrument of surrender is a clear violation of the agreement that was critical to the Biafrans’ decision to end hostilities and rejoin Nigeria. This breach of trust, coupled with the political and economic marginalisation that has resulted from the creation of states in other regions, undermines the legitimacy of Nigeria’s governance over the South-East and strengthens the case for remedial secession.
The violation of the surrender agreement has had lasting consequences for the South-East region, depriving it of the political power and federal resources it needs to thrive within the Nigerian state. The failure to honour the terms of the agreement, along with the continued exclusion of the South-East from key political and economic decisions, has created an environment of injustice and inequality that cannot be resolved within the current political framework. As a result, the South-East’s pursuit of remedial secession is not only justified but necessary to ensure the protection of the region’s rights and to achieve the justice that was promised but never delivered.
Uche Mefor is the Convenor of the Igbo-Biafra Nationalists and the Indigenous People of Nation for Self-determination
